Context
Keep is a PoC zero-trust access stack (Envoy + OPA + device posture). The README explicitly marks it "NOT FOR PRODUCTION USE" but two gaps are blockers for any production consideration.
Problems
1. Unauthenticated device posture updates
The device attestation agent sends posture data to the inventory service without any verification. An attacker can forge device posture to bypass access policies. This is the critical gap before any production consideration.
2. OPA receives hardcoded request metadata
evaluateOPA hardcodes "/" and "GET" for request path/method — never passes actual request metadata from the Envoy ext_authz request. This means path-based and method-based policies are impossible.
Requirements
Open question
Issue #47 (Research: Study Teleport certificate-based auth model) suggests the team is evaluating alternatives. Should keep be promoted to production, or will Teleport replace it? An architectural decision record would help.
Context
Keep is a PoC zero-trust access stack (Envoy + OPA + device posture). The README explicitly marks it "NOT FOR PRODUCTION USE" but two gaps are blockers for any production consideration.
Problems
1. Unauthenticated device posture updates
The device attestation agent sends posture data to the inventory service without any verification. An attacker can forge device posture to bypass access policies. This is the critical gap before any production consideration.
2. OPA receives hardcoded request metadata
evaluateOPAhardcodes"/"and"GET"for request path/method — never passes actual request metadata from the Envoy ext_authz request. This means path-based and method-based policies are impossible.Requirements
Open question
Issue #47 (Research: Study Teleport certificate-based auth model) suggests the team is evaluating alternatives. Should keep be promoted to production, or will Teleport replace it? An architectural decision record would help.